

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 USIE-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 /083 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2554

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3578

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: DRAFT MC COMMENT ON SHAPE ASSESSMENT OF OPTION III

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS THE DRAFT MC COMMENT ON SHAPE ASSESSMENT OF OPTION III. THIS DRAFT, PREPARED BY IMS, WILL BE ON AGENDA OF MC MEMBERS WHOSE GOVERNMENTS BELONG TO NPG ON JULY 14. IF APPROVED, IT WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO NAC. US DEL MC HAS REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS.

2. THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 10 APPEARS TO BE AN IMS EFFORT AT LANGUAGE ON SPECIFICITY OF COMMON CEILING WHICH MIGHT BE ACCEPTED BY ALL. THE JUDGMENT IN THIS SENTENCE SEEMS AS MUCH POLITICAL AS MILITARY, AND WE ASSUME US POSITION ON THE SENTENCE WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT CURRENT DEBATE IN SPC ON SPECIFICITY OF COMMON CEILING. IN GENERAL, WE WOULD HOPE INSTRUCTIONS TO US DEL MC WOULD ONLY REQUEST THOSE CHANGES WHICH ARE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE TRANSMITTAL OF MC COMMENT TO NAC.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

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SUBJECT: MBFR: ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF "THE US VIEWS ON THE NEXT STEPS IN MBFR."

1. SACEUR'S ASSESSMENT(1) ON THE "US VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS IN

MBFR"(2), UP-DATING AN EARLIER SHAPE ASSESSMENT(3) OF THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF OPTION III OF THE "US APPROACH TO MBFR", HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO YOU UNDER SEPARATE (CTS) COVER, TOGETHER WITH A SUPPORTING PAPER BY SHAPE(4).

2. AS YOU KNOW, I WAS TASKED BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON 11 JUNE 1975, TO PRODUCE A REPORT. I HAVE PREPARED, AND INCLUDE AS AN ANNEX TO THIS MEMORANDUM, A DRAFT CMCM TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. IN THIS DRAFT, I HAVE SOUGHT TO FOCUS ON THE CRITICAL MILITARY ISSUES REQUIRING COMMENT AND DESERVING OF CONSIDERATION IN COUNCIL. THE DRAFT CMCM, WHEN AGREED AND FORWARDED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, WILL INCLUDE SACEUR'S REPORT(1), BUT NOT THE SUPPORTING, DETAILED SHAPE STAFF ASSESSMENT(4).

3. IN VIEW OF THE URGENCY, I PROPOSE TO CALL A MEETING OF THE PERMANENT MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES IN THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP ON 14 JULY 1975, TO DISCUSS THE ATTACHED DRAFT CMCM. I HOPE TO FINALISE THE REPORT ON THAT DATE, SO THAT THE MILITARY COMMENT CAN BE GIVEN FULL WEIGHT IN THE URGENT POLITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE US PROPOSAL. THE MEETING IS PROPOSED FOR 1500 AND AN AGENDA WILL BE ISSUED IN DUE COURSE.

P.J. HILL-NORTON
ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET
CHAIRMAN, MILITARY COMMITTEE

1 ENCLOSURE:
DRAFT CMCM

(1) SHAPE 1000.1/20-5-3/S53/75, 28 JUNE 75
(2) USNATO/POL/OUT/NS/75-52(ISSUED UNDER IMSM-334-75, 12 JUNE 1975)
(3) SHAPE 1000.1/20-5-4/73(CTS), 25 AUGUST 1973
(4) SHAPE 1000.1/20-5-3/S52/75, 28 JUNE 75

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

SUBJECT: MBFR: ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE "US VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS IN MBFR."

AT THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING ON 11 JUNE, 1975, THE UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, IN PRESENTING THE PAPER ON THE "US VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS IN MBFR"(1), PROPOSED(2), INTER ALIA, THAT THE CHAIRMAN MILITARY COMMITTEE REQUEST SACEUR TO UPDATE THE SHAPE ASSESSMENTS OF THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF A HYPOTHETICAL REDUCTION OPTION(3) EXAMINED IN 1973, WHICH INVOLVED WITHDRAWAL OF US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS OF THE FORM AND SCALE AS PROPOSED IN THE "US VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS IN MBFR" OF 11 JUNE, 1975.

2. A CURRENT ASSESSMENT BY SACEUR(4) IS AT ANNEX(5). THE SPEED OF PRODUCTION OF THIS ASSESSMENT IS GREATLY APPRECIATED; AS IS THE FACT THAT SACEUR'S LUCID AND COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ISOLATES THE CENTRAL ISSUES REQUIRING MILITARY CONSIDERATION, AND PRESENTS THEM IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PERMIT REVIEW AT NATO HEADQUARTERS WITHOUT THE NECESSITY FOR REFERENCE TO THE MORE DETAILED AND HIGHLY-CLASSIFIED SUPPORTING INFORMATION AND STAFF STUDIES.

3. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IS FAMILIAR WITH THE CONTENT OF THE US PROPOSAL(1) AND OF THE REASONS FOR PUTTING IT FORWARD. THESE ARE NOT RECAPITULATED IN THIS MEMORANDUM.

MILITARY EXAMINATION

4. THE US PROPOSAL OF 11 JUNE, 1975, AND THE UPDATED ASSESSMENT BY SACEUR, HAVE BEEN EXAMINED BY ME IN CONJUNCTION WITH THOSE MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE INVOLVED IN NUCLEAR ISSUES. THE RESULTS OF THIS REVIEW ARE RECORDED IN THE SUCCEEDING PARAGRAPHS.

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- (1) USNATO/POL/OUT/NS/75-52
 - (2) USNATO/POL/OUT/NS/75-53
 - (3) US APPROACH TO MBFR, 30 APRIL, 1973 (OPTION III)
 - (4) SH.1000.1/20-5-3-S.53/75, 28 JUNE, 1975
 - (5) TO BE ATTACHED TO FINAL APPROVED DRAFT
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5. THE ORIGINAL, 1973, MIXED PACKAGE(1) REQUIRED NOT ONLY THE WITHDRAWAL OF A USSR TANK ARMY, BUT ALSO ITS DISBANDMENT. THE US NOTE OF 11 JUNE, 1975, CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL ONLY; AND DOES NOT SPECIFY THAT IT SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN TO THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR. SACEUR FINDS (PARA 3 OF ANNEX) THAT THE 1973 FORMAT WAS MORE PRECISE AND MORE FAVOURABLE TO NATO. HE HOLDS THE SAME VIEW AS TO THE STOCKS OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM WHICH SELECTION SHOULD BE MADE OF THE WARHEADS TO BE WITHDRAWN.

6. THE FORCE OF THE ARGUMENT FOR DISBANDMENT OF THE USSR TANK ARMY IS APPRECIATED. HOWEVER, DISBANDMENT WOULD BE EFFECTIVE ONLY IF IT ENTAILED A CEILING ON USSR TANK ARMIES/DIVISIONS SPECIFICALLY, AND ON USSR GROUND FORCES GENERALLY, WITHIN SOVIET TERRITORY. THE USSR COULD OTHERWISE MAKE GOOD THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY. MOREOVER, IF INSISTED UPON, IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT THE USSR WOULD INSIST THAT US FORCES WITHDRAWN SHOULD SIMILARLY BE DISBANDED AND SHOULD SIMILARLY BE CONSTRAINED BY CEILINGS: THAT WOULD INVOLVE SERIOUS DISADVANTAGE FOR ALLIED SECURITY. IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED THAT DISBANDMENT OF THE WITHDRAWN USSR TANK ARMY IS DESIRABLE, BUT ONLY IF IT CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT RECIPROCAL US DISBANDMENTS.

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7. WITH REGARD TO TWO OTHER POINTS MADE BY SACEUR IN THIS
CONTEXT AND MENTIONED AT PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE:

A. SACEUR MAKES THE POINT THAT WHEREAS THE ORIGINAL OPTION III
SPECIFIED THAT THE USSR TANK ARMY TO BE WITHDRAWN SHOULD BE
REMOVED TO THE SOVIET UNION, THE US PROPOSAL OF 11 JUNE, 1975 IS NOT
SO SPECIFIC. THIS COULD PERMIT THE INTERPRETATION THAT THE TANK
ARMY COULD BE WITHDRAWN TO, FOR

(1) USNATO/POL/OUT/NS/75-52

EXAMPLE, HUNGARY. SACEUR TAKES THE VIEW THAT ANY ALLIED PROPOSAL
SHOULD BE SPECIFIC IN REQUIRING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TANK ARMY TO
THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR. THIS VIEW IS FULLY ENDORSED.

B. THE WITHDRAWALS PROPOSED IN THE US NOTE OF 11 JUNE, 1975,
ALTHOUGH PRECISELY THE SAME QUANTITATIVELY AS THOSE EXAMINED UNDER
OPTION III IN 1973, DIFFER IN THAT THE NEW PROPOSAL SPECIFIES THAT
THE 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS TO BE WITHDRAWN WOULD BE TAKEN FROM
WARHEADS ASSOCIATED WITH US UNITS. SACEUR HAS STRESSED (PARAGRAPH
3 OF ANNEX) THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF A LITERAL APPLICATION OF
THE LIMITATIONS THUS APPARENTLY IMPOSED ON THE SELECTION OF WARHEADS
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FOR REDUCTION. MY COLLEAGUES IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND I
STRONGLY ENDORSE SACEUR'S CONCERN: WE BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT
THE FIELD OF SELECTION OF WARHEADS TO BE WITHDRAWN SHOULD INCLUDE
WARHEADS WHICH, HAVING BECOME SURPLUS TO REQUIREMENTS IN THE TIME

SCALE OF PHASE 1 NEGOTIATIONS, REVERT TO US STOCKS. THIS LATTER ARRANGEMENT WOULD ENABLE THE ALLIES TO SELECT FOR WITHDRAWAL SOME 500 NUCLEAR WARHEADS SURPLUS TO REQUIREMENTS FOR HONEST JOHN AND SERGEANT LAUNCHERS.

8. WE ENDORSE THE JUDGMENT BY SACEUR THAT ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE'S

CAPABILITY IN CENTRAL REGION WOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED IF THE WITHDRAWALS OF NUCLEAR ELEMENTS AS PROPOSED IN THE US NOTE OF 11 JUNE, 1975 WERE CARRIED OUT, SUBJECT TO ADEQUATE AND ASSURED ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE FOR THE RAPID RETURN OF THESE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS (AND PARTICULARLY THE NUCLEAR CAPABLE F4 AIRCRAFT) AS REQUIRED IN A CRISIS SITUATION. FAILING SUCH ASSURED ARRANGEMENTS, EITHER THROUGH MBFR TREATY OBLIGATIONS OR BECAUSE OF GENUINE PRATICAL DIFFICULTIES (E.G. SHORTAGE OF AIRLIFT), ACE CAPABILITY WOULD SUFFER. WE WOULD EMPHASISE, IN PARTICULAR, THE NEED FOR VERY RAPID RETURN OF THE F4 AIRCRAFT IN A CRISIS SITUATION. THE AVAILABILITY OF THE AIRCRAFT COULD BE A CRITICAL ELEMENT IN ALLIED RESPONSE IN THE CRUCIAL FIRST DAYS OF COMBAT.

9. WARSAW PACT SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS. WE NOTE THE SACEUR VIEW THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT THE SUPPORT WEAPONS INCLUDING THE NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS ORGANIC TO THE SOVIET TANK ARMY WILL BE WITHDRAWN WITH THE TANK ARMY. WE ENDORSE THAT VIEW. HOWEVER, AS THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IN PHASE 1 IS WITHDRAWAL OF THE USSR TANK FORMATIONS, AGAINST WHICH THE ALLIED CAPABILITY FOR CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE IS LESS CREDIBLE AND LESS EFFECTIVE THAN IN OTHER ASPECTS OF DEFENCE, WE ASSESS THE IMPORTANCE OF SPECIFIED WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS ORGANIC TO THE TANK ARMY AS SECONDARY TO ACHIEVEMENT OF WITHDRAWAL OF THE TANK FORMATIONS THEMSELVES.

CEILINGS AND CONSTRAINTS

10. IT IS NOTED THAT, IN THE US. NOTE OF 11 JUNE, 1975, THE US CONSIDER THE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS LISTED TO BE THE BEST MAKE-WEIGHT, ADDITIONAL TO CURRENT ALLIED NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS, FOR REDUCING THE MANPOWER AND TANK ASYMMETRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND ACHIEVING ALLIANCE PHASE 1 OBJECTIVES OF WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY INCLUDING 68,000 MEN AND 1,700 TANKS, AND AGREEMENT BY THE
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WARSAW PACT TO THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING. MILITARILY, IT WOULD BE GREATLY PREFERABLE THAT SUCH A WARSAW PACT COMMITMENT SHOULD SPECIFICALLY UNDERTAKE TO REDUCE FORCES ON A SCALE WHICH, POST PHASE 2 OF MBFR, WOULD RESULT IN APPROXIMATE PARITY OF MANPOWER.

11. WITH REGARD TO CONSTRAINTS ON US FORCES, WE ENDORSE THE US VIEW (PARA 28 OF THE US NOTE OF 11 JUNE) THAT IT IS TO NATO'S ADVANTAGE TO DEFINE THE US ELEMENTS ON WHICH ANY LIMITATION WOULD BE IMPOSED, IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO RETAIN ESSENTIAL FLEXIBILITY IN THE US FORCE STRUCTURE, EVEN AT THE EXPENSE OF SOME NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE. THE ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED BY THE US, IF NEGOTIATED, WOULD ENABLE THE ALLIES, BECAUSE OF THE NARROW APPLICATION OF THE LIMITATION TO NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, TO

CONTINUE TO IMPROVE AND ENHANCE CAPABILITY IN AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN NUCLEAR-CAPABLE, AND IN THE SHORTER RANGE SSMS.

12. IN RESPECT OF TANKS, IT IS NOTED THAT, BEFORE ACCEPTING ANY SOVIET DEMANDS FOR A LIMITATION ON US TANKS, THE US WOULD ASSURE THAT THE AGREEMENT ALLOWS RESTORATION OF US TANK STOCKS TO EARLIER LEVELS. THAT US POSITION IS TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE US ASSESSMENT (PARAS 38-43 OF THE US NOTE OF 11 JUNE, 1975) THAT THE USSR WILL PROBABLY DEMAND A LIMITATION ON US TANKS IN RECIPROCATION OF A US DEMAND FOR LIMITATION OF CERTAIN USSR NUCLEAR ELEMENTS ANALOGOUS TO THE US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS TO BE WITHDRAWN. HOWEVER, SUCH A USSR DEMAND MIGHT WELL BE MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT ALLIED REDUCTION PROPOSALS, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE ADDITION OF NUCLEAR ELEMENTS. WHATEVER THE CONTEXT OF SUCH A DEMAND, WE BELIEVE IT MILITARILY ESSENTIAL THAT THE US TANK STOCKS BE RESTORED TO PROGRAMMED LEVELS; AND THAT ANY LIMITATION SHOULD PERMIT OF THAT RESTORATION.

13. WE WELCOME AND STRONGLY ENDORSE THE US RECOMMENDATION (PARAGRAPH 44 OF THE US NOTE OF 11 JUNE) THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD AVOID ANY COMMITMENT IN PHASE I TO EXPLICIT LIMITS ON NON-US NATO ARMAMENTS. IF THIS WERE NOT TO BE ACHIEVED, THERE WOULD BE A NEED FOR FURTHER DETAILED AND SEARCHING MILITARY STUDY TO DETERMINE THE EFFECTS OF ANY LIMITATIONS SUGGESTED, AND THEIR MILITARY TOLERABILITY.

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